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Abstract 
The cultural cognition thesis holds that individuals form risk perceptions that reflect their 
commitments to contested views of the good society. We conducted a study that used the dispute 
over mandatory HPV vaccination to test the cultural cognition thesis. Although public health 
officials have recommended that all girls aged 11 or 12 be vaccinated for HPV—a sexually-
transmitted virus that causes cervical cancer—political controversy has blocked adoption of 
mandatory school-enrollment vaccination programs in all but one state. An experimental study of 
a large sample of American adults (N = 1,538) found that cultural cognition generates 
disagreement about the risks and benefits of the vaccine through two mechanisms: biased 
assimilation, and the credibility heuristic. We discuss theoretical and practical implications. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160654
The advent of the human-papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine was widely heralded as a “major 
public health breakthrough” (Kaufman, 2006, June 9, p. A1). that would “eventually save 
thousands of lives each year in the United States” (Harris, 2006, p. A1). Transmitted by sexual 
contact, HPV is the leading (likely the sole) cause of cervical cancer. It is estimated that as many 
as 45% of women in their early twenties have been infected by it (Dunne et al, 2007). Shortly 
after the FDA awarded “fast track” approval to the vaccine, the Center for Disease Control 
recommended that it be administered to all girls (no vaccine is currently approved for males) at 
age 11 or 12, before they are likely to have been exposed to the virus, at which point the vaccine 
becomes ineffective (CDC, 2006).  Public health advocates—financed conspicuously by Merck 
& Co., manufacturer of the vaccine—thereafter initiated a campaign to secure enactment of 
mandatory vaccination laws like those that require school children to be immunized against 
mumps, measles, rubella, and other childhood diseases (Saul & Pollack, 2007).  
Nevertheless, the proposal for mandatory vaccination of schoolgirls has been mired in 
intense controversy. The vaccine admittedly fails to protect against 30% of the strains of HPV 
that cause cervical cancer, and critics question its reported effectiveness against the remainder. 
They also worry about the likelihood that vaccination will have unanticipated (or undisclosed) 
adverse side-effects (Merck & Co., they point out, also manufactured Vioxx). Debate rages, too, 
over the possibility that vaccinated girls and young women, lulled into a false sense of security, 
will engage in greater amounts promiscuous and unprotected sex, thereby increasing their risk of 
pregnancy and other STDs (Alliance for Human Research Protection, 2007; Gibbs, 2006).  
Although the public argument features competing empirical claims, the battle lines are 
decidedly political. Commentaries promoting the case for mandatory vaccination appear in 
recognizably liberal media outlets like the New York Times (Brody, 2007), ones resisting it in 
familiar conservative ones like the Wall Street Journal (Carreyrou, 2006). Women’s advocacy 
groups lobby for mandatory vaccination programs (NOW, 2006), and traditional religious ones 
against them (Focus on the Family, 2007). 
As a result of such conflict, the campaign to implement mandatory school vaccination has 
faltered, if not failed. One program established by order of the Governor of Texas was repealed 
by the state legislature. Another program was passed by the New Mexico legislature but 
thereafter vetoed by the Governor. Numerous states have considered and rejected mandatory 
vaccination programs. To date only Virginia (site of a proposed Merck plant to manufacture the 
vaccine) and the District of Columbia have adopted ones (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2009; Rosenthal, 2008).1 
What explains the HPV-vaccination controversy? Are those on both sides genuinely 
uncertain about whether mandatory school vaccination would promote the health of girls and 
young women? Or are the positions they take—against but also for the mandatory vaccination—
an expression of moral or political values unrelated to the efficacy of the vaccine? 
One account of risk perception implies that the answer might well be a distinctive 
mixture of both of these explanations. The cultural theory of risk asserts that individuals 
selectively attend to risks and related facts in a way that reflects and reinforces their “cultural 
worldviews,” or preferences about how society should be organized (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). If this process is at work in the HPV vaccine debate, those on 
both sides are advancing the positions that they honestly believe promote the health of girls and 
young women. Yet the reason that they hold those particular beliefs is the congeniality of one or 
another set of risk perceptions to their preferred vision of the good society.  
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This paper uses the debate over mandatory HPV vaccination to test the cultural theory of 
risk. It seeks to determine, moreover, not just whether individuals’ cultural worldviews affect 
their risk perceptions, but, if they do, why. What are the psychological dynamics—the 
mechanisms of cultural cognition—that connect values to empirical beliefs of this sort? In an 
experimental study involving some 1,500 subjects, we found evidence that two mechanisms—
biased assimilation of information, and source credibility—do indeed seem to dispose persons of 
diverse values to adopt conflicting stances on the public health consequences of the proposal for 
mandatory HPV vaccination. We begin with a discussion of the theoretical background of the 
study before describing its design and reporting its results, and we conclude with some 
observations about its theoretical and practical implications  
Theoretical Background: Heuristics, Culture, and Risk 
The study of risk perception addresses a puzzle. How do people—particularly ordinary 
citizens who lack not only experience with myriad hazards but also the time and expertise 
necessary to make sense of complex technical data—form positions on the dangers they face and 
what they should do about them? 
Social psychology has made well-known progress toward answering this question. People 
(not just lay persons, but quite often experts too) rely on heuristic reasoning to deal with risk and 
uncertainty generally. They thus employ a range of “mental shortcuts”: when gauging the danger 
of a putatively hazardous activity (the possession, say, of a handgun, or the use of nuclear power 
generation), they consult a mental inventory of recalled instances of misfortunes involving it, 
give special weight to perceived authorities, and steer clear of options that could improve their 
situation but that also involve the potential to make them worse off than they are at present 
(“better safe, than sorry”) (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Slovic, 2000; Margolis, 1996). 
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They also employ faculties and styles of reasoning—most conspicuously affective ones informed 
by feelings such as hope and dread, admiration and disgust—that make it possible for them to 
respond rapidly to perceived exigency (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2004). 
To be sure, heuristic reasoning of this sort can lead to mistakes, particularly when they 
crowd out more considered, systematic forms of reasoning (Sunstein, 2005). But they are 
adaptive in the main (Slovic et al, 2004). 
As much as this account has enlarged our knowledge, it remains incomplete. In 
particular, a theory that focuses only on heuristic reasoning fails to supply a cogent account of 
the nature of political conflict over risk (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil, 2006). Citizens 
disagree, intensely, over a wide range of personal and societal hazards. If the imprecision of 
heuristic reasoning accounted for such variance, we might expect such disagreements to be 
randomly distributed across the population or correlated with personal characteristics (education, 
income, community type, exposure to news of particular hazards, and the like) that either 
plausibly related to one or another heuristic or that made the need for heuristic reasoning less 
necessary altogether. By and large, however, this is not the case. Instead, a large portion of the 
variance in risk perception coheres with membership in groups integral to personal identity, such 
as race, gender, political party membership, and religious affiliation (e.g. Slovic, 2000, p. 390; 
Kahan & Braman, 2006). Whether the planet is overheating; whether nuclear wastes can be 
safely disposed of; whether genetically modified foods are bad for human health—these are 
cultural issues in American society every bit as much as whether women should be allowed to 
have abortions and men should be allowed to marry other men (Kahan, 2007). Indeed, as 
unmistakably cultural in nature as these latter disputes are, public debate over them often 
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features competing claims about societal risks and benefits, and not merely competing values 
(e.g. Siegel, 2007; Pollock, 2005). 
This is the part of the risk-perception puzzle that the cultural theory of risk is distinctively 
concerned with (Douglass & Wildavsky, 1982). According to that theory, individuals conform 
their perceptions of risk to their cultural evaluations of putatively dangerous activities and the 
policies for regulating them. Thus, persons who subscribe to an “individualist” worldview react 
dismissively to claims of environmental and technological risks, societal recognition of which 
would threaten markets and other forms of private ordering. Persons attracted to “egalitarian” 
and “communitarian” worldviews, in contrast, readily credit claims of environmental risk: they 
find it congenial to believe that commerce and industry, activities they associate inequity and 
selfishness, cause societal harm. Precisely because the assertion that such activities cause harm 
impugns the authority of social elites, individuals of a “hierarchical worldview” are (in this case, 
like individualists) risk skeptical (Rayner, 1992).  
Researchers have furnished a considerable body of empirical support for these patterns of 
risk perception (Dake, 1991; Jenkins-Smith, 2001; Ellis & Thompson, 1997; Peters & Slovic, 
1996; Peters, Burriston & Mertz, 2004; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, 2007). Such 
studies have found that cultural worldviews explain variance more powerfully than myriad other 
characteristics, including socio-economic status, education, and political ideology, and can 
interact with and reinforce the effect of related sources of identity such as race and gender.  
Although one could see a rivalry between culture theory and the heuristic model (Marris, 
Langford, O’Riordan 1998; Douglas, 1997), it is unnecessary to view them as mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, one conception of the cultural theory—which we will call the cultural 
cognition thesis ((Kahan, Braman, Monahan, Callahan & Peters, in press; Kahan, Slovic, Braman 
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& Gastil, 2006)—seeks to integrate them. Culture theorists have had relatively little to say about 
exactly how culture shapes perceptions of risk.2 Cultural cognition posits that the connection is 
supplied by conventional heuristic processes, or at least some subset of them (DiMaggio, 1997). 
On this account, heuristic mechanisms interact with cultural values: People notice, assign 
significance to, and recall the instances of misfortune that fit their values; they trust the experts 
whose cultural outlooks match their own; they define the contingencies that make them worse 
off, or count as losses, with reference to culturally valued states of affairs; they react affectively 
toward risk on the basis of emotions that are themselves conditioned by cultural appraisals—and 
so forth. By supplying this account of the mechanisms through which culture shapes risk 
perceptions, cultural cognition not only helps to fill a lacuna in the cultural theory of risk. It also 
helps to complete the heuristic model by showing how one and the same heuristic process 
(whether availability, credibility, loss aversion, or affect) can generate different perceptions of 
risk in people with opposing outlooks. 
The proposition that moral evaluations of conduct shape the perceived consequences of 
such conduct is not unique to the cultural cognition thesis. Experimental study, for example, 
shows that negative affective responses mediate between moral condemnation of “taboo” 
behaviors and perceptions that those behaviors are harmful (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). 
The same conclusion is also supported by a number of correlational studies (Horvath & Giner-
Sorolla, 2007; Haidt & Hersh, 2001). The point of contact that the cultural cognition thesis, if 
demonstrated, would establish between cultural theory and these other works in morally 
motivated cognition would also lend strength to the psychological foundation of the former’s 
account of the origins of risk perceptions. 
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Research Hypotheses 
 
We conducted a study to assess how cultural values influence the perceptions of the risks 
and benefits of the HPV vaccine. The study had two objectives. One was to explore sources of 
the contemporary debate over mandatory school vaccination. The other was to assess the cultural 
cognition thesis by experimentally testing specific mechanisms through which culture might be 
thought to influence risk perceptions. We looked at two such mechanisms: biased assimilation 
and polarization and the credibility heuristic. 
Biased Assimilation and Polarization  
Biased assimilation refers to the tendency of individuals selectively to credit and dismiss 
information in a manner that confirms their prior beliefs. As a result, persons of opposing 
predispositions, it is thought, become more divided, not less, as they react to balanced arguments 
(Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979).3  
The cultural cognition thesis implies that this dynamic will interact with culture. That is, 
people will selectively credit or discredit information on risk in a manner that fits their cultural 
predispositions toward them, and thus polarize along cultural lines (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, 
Gastil & Cohen, 2009). 
The cultural theory of risk features a typology proposed by Mary Douglas (1970). That 
typology classifies worldviews, or preferences for how society should be organized, along two 
dimensions, which Douglas called “group” and “grid.” A “high group” worldview supports a 
relatively communitarian society, in which the needs of the collective take precedence over those 
of the individual and in which the collective is deemed responsible for securing the conditions of 
individual flourishing. A “low group” worldview, in contrast, supports an individualistic society, 
in which individuals are expected to secure the conditions of their own well-being without 
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interference or assistance from the collective. A “high grid” worldview supports a hierarchical 
social order, in which all manner of prerogatives and obligations are assigned in a stratified way 
on the basis of relatively stable individual characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, and class. A 
“low grid” worldview supports an egalitarian social order in which such characteristics are 
treated as irrelevant to the distribution of status and entitlements. “Group” and “grid” define 
cross-cutting continua, making it possible for groups to subscribe to outlooks that combine 
elements of either hierarchy or egalitarianism with elements of either communitarianism or 
individualism (Rayner, 1992). 
We hypothesized that cultural worldviews so defined would generate competing 
predispositions toward the risks and benefits of mandatory HPV vaccination. Hierarchy and 
individualism, we predicted, would dispose individuals to see relatively more risk, the former 
because mandatory vaccination of school girls seems to condone sexual behavior that defies 
traditional gender norms, and the latter because mandatory vaccination intrudes on individual 
decision-making. Accordingly, we expected persons who held these worldviews (particularly in 
combination) to perceive greater risks and smaller benefits in HPV vaccination. In contrast, we 
surmised that individuals who held egalitarian and communitarian worldviews (particularly in 
combination) would see greater benefits and fewer risks, precisely because such a program 
seems to express tolerance for behavior that denigrates traditional, patriarchal norms and 
embodies collective commitment to the provision of a good essential to individual well-being.  
The predicted relationship between biased assimilation and culture implies that these 
predispositions should influence how individuals react to information. Accordingly, the risk-
perception gulf between relatively hierarchical and individualistic persons, on the one hand, and 
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relatively egalitarian and communitarian ones, on the other, should grow when such persons are 
exposed to arguments about the risks and benefits of mandatory vaccination. 
Credibility Heuristic 
It has been known for decades that individuals’ evaluations of the strength of an 
argument depends largely on how credible they find the source of that argument (Hovland & 
Weiss, 1951-52). Elements of credibility include knowledge, honesty and impartiality (e.g. 
McCroskey & Young, 1981; Pornpitakpan, 2004). It is also well established that individuals tend 
to impute these qualities to, and hence to be more persuaded by, information sources with whom 
they have some “in group” connection, and to deny the same to “out group” information sources 
(Mackie & Quellar, 2000; Clark & Maass, 1988, p. 381). 
The cultural cognition thesis suggests that the operation of the credibility heuristic will be 
highly sensitive to the source’s and target’s cultural worldviews. On this account, cultural 
affinity and cultural difference supply the relevant in-group/out-groups references that in turn 
determine whom people see as knowledgeable, honest, and unbiased, and thus worthy of being 
credited in debates about risk. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the effect of HPV-vaccine 
arguments in polarizing persons of diverse values would be either accentuated or muted 
depending on their relative affinity with the cultural values of argument sources taking one 
position or the other on the risks and benefits of mandatory vaccination. 
Methods 
 
Overview 
We constructed a multi-part experiment to test these hypotheses. It involved a between-
subjects design in which perceptions of HPV vaccine risks and benefits were measured in three 
conditions: “no argument,” in which subjects furnished their responses without being exposed to 
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any arguments about mandatory vaccination programs; “unattributed arguments,” in which 
subjects furnished responses after being exposed to opposing arguments unattributed to 
identified sources; and “culturally identifiable advocates,” in which subjects furnished responses 
after being exposed to opposing arguments attributed to fictional policy experts designed to be 
perceived as possessing one or another of the combination of worldviews featured in cultural 
theory. Our biased-assimilation hypotheses implied that the gap between relatively egalitarian 
and communitarian subjects, on the one hand, and relatively hierarchical and individualistic ones 
on the other, would be larger in the “unattributed arguments” than in the “no arguments” 
condition. Our credibility-heuristic hypotheses implied that the size of this gap would vary in the 
“culturally identifiable advocate” condition depending on the relative affinity between subjects’ 
values, on the one hand, and those of the advocates presenting the opposing arguments, on the 
other. 
Sample  
Experiment subjects consisted of a demographically diverse, national sample of 1,538 
U.S. adults. They were drawn randomly from a panel of approximately 40,000 individuals 
recruited by Knowledge Networks for participation in scholarly public opinion analysis.4 
Subjects were tested in two separate waves of on-line experiments (first the “no argument” and 
“unattributed arguments” conditions, then the “culturally identifiable advocates” condition) 
administered by Knowledge Networks in April and August of 2007. The sample size was 254 for 
the no-argument condition, 252 for the argument-without-advocate condition, and 1,032 for the 
argument-with-advocates condition. 
Measures 
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Cultural worldview. The subjects’ cultural worldviews were measured (in a prescreening 
conducted in advance of the experiment) with two scales used in previous studies of the cultural 
theory of risk and cultural cognition (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil & Cohen, 2009; Kahan, 
Braman, Monahan, Callahan & Peters, in press; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, 2007; 
Kahan & Braman, 2008; Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, 2009). “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” 
(“Hierarchy”) consisted of 12 items, and “Individualism-Communitarianism” (“Individualism”) 
18 items, designed to assess subjects’ worldviews along those two dimensions. Items consisted 
of statements (e.g., “A lot of problems in our society today come from the decline in the 
traditional family, where the man works and the woman stays home”; “Society works best when 
it lets individuals take responsibility for their own lives without telling them what to do”), to 
which respondents indicated their level of disagreement or agreement on a four-point scale. Both 
Hierarchy (α = .80) and Individualism (α = .82) were highly reliable.5 
HPV risk-benefit perception and introductory statements. Subjects in all conditions 
responded on a four-point scale to a series of items (randomly ordered) relating to HPV vaccine 
risks and benefits. 
POLICYNEED. It is important to devise public health policies to reduce the spread of 
HPV. [Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree] 
HPVSAFE. The HPV vaccine is safe for use among young girls. [Strongly disagree, 
disagree, agree, strongly agree] 
VACDANGER. Universal vaccination of girls for HPV will likely endanger their health. 
[Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree] 
HPVACTIVE. Universal vaccination of girls for HPV will lead girls to become more 
sexually active. [Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree] 
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FALSESECURITY. Girls vaccinated against HPV are more likely to engage in sex 
without a condom. [Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree] 
HPVBENEFIT. How beneficial would you say universal vaccination of girls against HPV 
is likely to be? [Not at all beneficial, slightly beneficial, moderately beneficial, very 
beneficial] 
HPVRISK. How risk would you say universal vaccination of girls against HPV is likely to 
be? [Not at all risky, slightly risk, moderately risky, very risky] 
The items were combined into a scale, VACRISK (α = .84), in which POLICYNEED, 
HPVSAFE, and HPVBENEFIT were reverse-coded, that measured a latent disposition to see risk 
over benefit. 
Before responding to these items, subjects read an introductory statement. In all 
conditions, that statement began, 
Some public health experts favor universal vaccination of American girls (at or before age 
12) to protect them from catching human papillomavirus (HPV). Other public health 
experts oppose such a program. 
The “no argument” condition subjects were then advised “[w]e’d like to know what you think” 
and immediately requested to respond to the risk-benefit items. 
Pro and con arguments. Before they responded to the risk-benefit items, the 250 subjects 
in the “unattributed arguments” condition were directed to read opposing, pro- and con- 
arguments (juxtaposed on the screen, and rotated in position), which were introduced with the 
statement “[h]ere are what two opposing policy experts say.” The arguments are presented in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Opposing arguments on mandatory HPV vaccination 
For HPV vaccination program. Studies 
show that nearly 50% of sexually active 
Americans now contract HPV, which is the 
leading cause of cervical cancer. Girls 
administered the vaccine will be protected 
from a variety of forms of HPV, which 
account for 70% of the cancers attributed to 
the virus. It is critical for vaccinations to be 
administered before the age at which girls are 
likely to become sexually active, because 
once they are exposed to HPV through sexual 
activity the vaccine won’t be effective. The 
Food and Drug Administration has certified 
the vaccine as safe for use. Because so few 
girls even know what HPV is, it is illogical to 
suggest that the vaccination will cause them 
to become more sexually active or to engage 
in unsafe sex. It is therefore clear that 
universal vaccination of girls against HPV 
will make a major positive contribution to 
public health in America. 
Against HPV vaccination program. The 
rate of cervical cancer, a disease caused by 
HPV, is in fact extremely low: it accounts for 
less than 1% of all the cancer cases in the 
U.S. every year. Moreover, the vaccine offers 
no protection against types of HPV 
responsible for 30% of the cancers caused by 
the virus. Nevertheless, those who receive the 
vaccination are likely to assume it gives them 
complete protection. They are therefore more 
likely to engage in sexual activity, and to 
engage in sex without a condom, increasing 
their risk of contracting HPV and other 
sexually transmitted diseases, like HIV-
AIDS, and of becoming pregnant. Finally, the 
HPV vaccine might well turn out to have 
unanticipated and dangerous side effects – 
just like many other medicines approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration. In sum, a 
universal HPV vaccine is likely to harm girls 
and women more than it helps. 
 
 
Culturally identifiable advocates and cultural affinity scores. After the introductory 
statement, the 1,022 subjects in the “culturally identifiable advocate” condition read:  
Here are what two opposing policy experts say. Each advocate is on the faculty of a major 
university and has written numerous books on public policy.”  
They were then shown the same pro- and con- arguments (again juxtaposed, and rotated) as had 
been shown to subjects in the “unattributed arguments” condition. However, at the top of each 
argument in the “culturally identifiable advocate” condition there appeared a picture of the 
ostensible source of the argument and a set of his (fictional) book titles (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Culturally Identifiable Advocates  
Hierarchist
Egalitarian
CommunitarianIndividualist
Books:
?Three Social Evils: Sexism, Racism, 
and Homophobia 
?Raising Children: Avoiding Sexual 
Stereotypes 
?People Before Profit! Fixing 
Corporate America 
?Society as Family: One for All and 
All for One
Books:
•Against Race and Sex 
Discrimination, For Individual 
Freedom!
•A Free Market Defense of 
Workplace Equality
•Respect for Individual Choice: the 
Cornerstone of a Free and Equal 
Society 
•Stop Treating Us Like Infants: Why 
Government Shouldn't Tell Adults 
What to Do
Books:
•The Immigrant Invasion: Threatening 
the American Way of Life
•The War on American Manhood
•Selfishness Is Not a Vice: Individual 
Freedom and the Public Good
•Why Big Government Doesn't Work
Books:
•The Crisis of Authority: The Assault on 
Traditional Values in America 
•How "Women's Liberation" Hurts Women 
- and Men and Children, too! 
•Community First: Fighting Selfishness in 
American Society 
•The Limits of Individual Rights
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The advocates were created in a separate set of pretests. In the first set, pretest subjects 
were each shown a picture of one individual and asked to guess how that individual would 
respond to the cultural worldview items. In subsequent pretests, additional subjects were asked to 
guess the responses of a single pictured individual described as the author of a list of books. Over 
the course of several such tests, we created a set of four advocates, each of whom generated a 
highly reliable imputed culture score that was significantly different from each other one’s and 
that located him in one of the four quadrants (“hierarchical individualist,” “hierarchical 
communitarian,” “egalitarian individualist,” and “egalitarian communitarian”) demarcated by the 
intersection of Douglas’s (1970) two worldview dimensions. To avoid the entangling of cultural-
affinity influences on credibility with any related to the source’s race and gender, all the 
culturally identifiable advocates were white males. The pictured individuals consisted of three 
law school professors not known to the general public and one picture from a licensed royalty-
free photo disc. 
In the credibility component of the actual experiment, arguments were randomly matched 
with advocates. Each of the four advocates could be assigned to either argument and be opposed 
to any one of the other three advocates. There were thus 12 distinct advocate-argument pairings 
in total. Each subject in the “culturally identifiable advocate” condition (none of whom 
participated in pretests used to construct the advocates) was randomly assigned one of these 
argument-advocate pairings.  
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Figure 3. Derivation of “Cultural Affinity” Measure. The worldview scores of a subject and 
the worldview scores attributed to fictional policy experts can all be mapped on a grid 
constructed by the intersection of the four-point Hierarchy-Egalitarian and Individualist-
Communitarian worldview scales. The proximity of the subject’s worldview to the pro-vaccine 
advocate’s worldivew, PA, equals √(p2+q2). The proximity of the subject’s worldview to the con-
advocate’s worldview, CA, equals √(r2+s2). A “Cultural Affinity” score can be derived by 
subtracting CA from PA, which reflects how much closer the subject’s worldview is to that of the 
con-advocate than to that of the pro-advocate. The cultural-credibility hypothesis predicts that 
Cultural Affinity will correlate positively with VACRISK after controlling for subjects’ cultural 
worldviews. 
 
 
Hierarchist
Egalitarian
CommunitarianIndividualist
Con-
Advocate
Pro-
Advocate
Subject
q
r
p
s
PA
CA
Treating the grid created by the intersection of the two worldview scales as a “cultural 
map,” it was possible to compute the distance between every subject’s worldview and the 
worldview imputed to each advocate in his or her pairing. Insofar as both Hierarchy and 
Individualism are continuous four-point scales, they can be conceived of as forming a 4 x 4 grid 
in which they intersect each other at right angles at their respective midpoints. On the resulting 
grid, each subject can be located at a unique two-point coordinate corresponding to his or her 
respective Hierarchy and Individualism scores. The “distance” between any subject and any 
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advocate on that grid equals the square root of the sum of the squares of the differences between 
the Hierarchy scores of the subject and advocate and the Individualism scores of the subject and 
the advocate. Subtracting the distance between the subject’s and the con-advocate’s worldviews 
from the distance between the subject’s and the pro-advocate’s worldviews generated a “Cultural 
Affinity” score that measured how much more proximate the subject’s values were to the con-
advocate’s than to the pro-advocate’s (Figure 3). The hypothesized relationship between cultural 
affinity and credibility implied that, holding subjects’ cultural worldviews constant, subjects’ 
VACRISK score (their perceived predominance of risk to benefits) would increase as their 
Cultural Affinity score (the relative proximity of their cultural values to the perceived values of 
the con-advocate) increased. 
Statistical Analyses 
It was anticipated that the results for both the biased-assimilation and credibility-heuristic 
components of the experiment would be analyzed by multivariate regression. Multivariate 
regression is preferred over analysis of variance (ANOVA) for experimental designs, such as 
ours, that involve measure of the effect of continuous predictors (Aiken, West & Reno, 1991, pp. 
167-68; Judd, 2000, p. 372; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003, p. 86).6 
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Results 
Biased Assimilation and Polarization 
In the first stage of the experiment, we compared the risk perceptions of subjects in the 
“no argument” condition and the “unattributed arguments” condition. This procedure permitted 
testing of the biased assimilation hypotheses. 
Zero-order correlations were consistent with the hypothesized results. In the “no 
argument” condition, Hierarchy correlated positively (r = .18, p < .01) with VACRISK, 
indicating that subjects perceived greater risk as they became more hierarchical and less risk as 
they became more egalitarian. Consistent with biased assimilation, this effect was even larger (r 
= .32, p < .01) in the “unattributed arguments” condition. The simple correlation between 
Individualism and VACRISK (r = .07, p = .27) was not significant in the “no arguments” 
condition. However, also consistent with biased assimilation, there was a significant positive 
correlation (r = .19, p < .01) in the “unattributed arguments” condition, indicating that subjects 
exposed to arguments became more concerned about risk as their worldviews became more 
individualistic and less concerned as their worldviews became more communitarian. 
Multivariate analysis allowed for a more exacting assessment of the results. To confirm 
the significance of the experimental manipulation and to disentangle the relative contributions of 
the two worldview measures, we used a regression analysis in which the cultural worldview 
measures, assignment to the “unattributed arguments” (Argument = 1) or “no argument” 
condition (Argument = 0), and finally the variables for the interactions between the experimental 
condition and each cultural worldview measure were entered in three steps (Cohen, Cohen, West 
& Aiken, 2003, p. 555-56; Judd, 2000, pp. 374-75).  
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The results, as shown in Table 1, confirmed that argument exposure generated a 
culturally polarizing effect. The significance of the F statistic in step 2, indicating that the 
addition of the argument exposure variable significantly increased the explanatory power of the 
model, shows that argument exposure affected subjects’ responses overall. Neither the 
interaction between Hierarchy and argument exposure (B = .29, p = .08) nor Individualism and 
argument exposure (B = .19, p = .40) was statistically significant on its own. However, the 
combined effect of these interactions was significant: the significant F statistic in step 3 indicates 
that taking account of the differential effect of argument exposure across persons of diverse 
cultural worldviews has an effect that is not captured by the impact of argument exposure alone 
(Judd, 2000, p. 373). Moreover, because the signs of both of the interaction variables are 
positive, it is clear that argument exposure significantly increases risk concern as subjects’ 
worldviews become simultaneously more hierarchical and individualistic. 
Table 1. Regression Analysis of results from “No Argument” and “Unattributed 
Arguments” Conditions 
 
  
 Hierarchy 
 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
0.38 0.41 0.27 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) 
Individualism 0.09 -0.01 -0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) 
Arguments  0.51 -0.72 
  (0.07) (0.50) 
Hierarchy x Arguments   0.29 
  (0.17) 
Individualism x Arguments  0.19 
  (0.22) 
Constant 1.37 1.33 1.96 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.37) 
R2  0.07 0.16 0.17 
F for ΔR2  53.20 4.11 
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N = 506. Dependent variable is 4-pt, VACRISK scale. Coefficients are unstandardized regression 
weights, with standard errors in parentheses. Bold denotes significant at p ≤ .05, underscored at p 
≤ .10. 
 
The practical impact of this effect can be illustrated by using the regression equation in 
step 3 to estimate scores on VACRISK. Setting the values for Hierarchy one standard below and 
one standard deviation above the mean on that scale generates the estimated responses for 
moderately “egalitarian” and “hierarchal” individuals, respectively (Cohen, Cohen, West & 
Aiken, 2003, p. 558). Similarly, setting the values for Individualism one standard deviation 
below and above the mean of the range for sample scores on that scale generates the estimated 
response for moderately “communitarian” and moderately “individualistic” persons, 
respectively. By appropriately combining these values, it is possible to estimate the VACRISK 
scores, along with associated standard errors, for representative “hierarchical individualists,” 
“hierarchical communitarians,” “egalitarian individualists,” and “egalitarian communitarians,” 
both when they are exposed to arguments and when they are not. 
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 2. As can be seen, being exposed to 
arguments raises the perception of risk overall. But how much it increases it is conditional on 
cultural worldviews. The difference on the four-point VACRISK scale between a hierarchical 
individualist and an egalitarian communitarian—the types of subjects we predicted would be 
most disposed to react in extreme ways to arguments—increases from .16 in the “no argument” 
condition to .57 in the “unattributed arguments” condition, or .41 overall, a statistically 
significant change.  
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Table 2. Estimated Values (and Standard Errors) For Effect of Receiving Unattributed 
Arguments 
 No Argument Unattributed Arguments  
  EV 
  
EV Polarization 
Overall 
  
2.31 
(0.05) 
2.81 
(0.05) NA  
Hierarchical Individualist 
 
2.38 
(0.07) 
3.09 
(0.07) 
0.41 
(0.15) 
Egalitarian Communitarian 
  
2.22 
(0.07) 
2.52 
(0.07) 
Hierarchical Communitarian 
 
2.46 
(0.12) 
3.03 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.29) 
Egalitarian Individualist 
 
2.14 
(0.12) 
2.57 
(0.10) 
N = 506. Estimated values are for the 4-pt VACRISK scale and are derived from step 3 of 
regression model in Table 1. “Polarization” refers to increase in size of differences of 
opposing groups across conditions. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold denotes differences 
in predicted values for paired groups within condition, or increase in size of difference across 
conditions (“Polarization”), significant at p ≤ .05.  
 
The difference between an egalitarian individualist and a hierarchical communitarian 
increases across conditions, too, but by a lesser and not statistically significant amount. This 
result confirms that the significance of the interaction between argument exposure and the 
culture variables reflected in Step 3 of the regression model arises from sum of the differential 
effects of arguments across both dimensions of worldview as opposed to the differential effect of 
arguments across only one of them. 
Credibility Heuristic  
We also used multivariate regression to analyze the results in the credibility experiment. 
In the analysis, subject scores on VACRISK, the composite mandatory-vaccine risk-perception 
scale, were regressed on subjects’ cultural worldview scores and on their “cultural affinity” 
scores, which measured how much more proximate their cultural worldviews were to the 
advocate presenting the con-vaccination argument than the pro-vaccination argument (Figure 3). 
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The results are reflected in Table 3. The coefficient for Cultural Affinity was positive and 
statistically significant: As hypothesized, the closer subjects’ values were to the con-argument 
advocate’s than to the pro-advocate’s, the more risk subjects were disposed to see. The positive 
coefficients for Hierarchy and Individualism indicated that, holding proximity to pro- and con-
advocates constant, subjects were more disposed to see risk as their values became more 
hierarchical and individualistic. This effect was only marginally significant (p = .09), however, 
for Individualism considered alone. 
Table. 3. Regression Analysis of Results in “Culturally Identifiable Advocates” Condition 
 
 
Hierarch  0.42 
  (0.07) 
Individ  0.14 
  (0.09) 
Cultural Affinity  0.19 
  (0.07) 
Constant  1.43 
  (0.22) 
R2   .07 
 
 N = 1,032. Dependent variable is 4-pt, VACRISK scale. “Cultural affinity” measures how much 
closer subject’s values were to values of advocate opposed to vaccine than to advocate 
supporting vaccine. Coefficients are unstandardized regression weights, with standard errors in 
parentheses. Bold denotes significant at p ≤ .05, underscored at p ≤ .10. 
To illustrate the practical impact of advocate-subject cultural affinity, one can use the 
regression analysis in Table 3 to estimate VACRISK scores for appropriately specified 
independent variable values. Combinations of Hierarchy and Individualism values set one 
standard deviation either above or below the means on those scales can again be used to assess 
the responses of representative “hierarchical individualists,” “egalitarian communitarians,” 
“hierarchical communitarians,” and “egalitarian individualists.”  
The value assigned to Cultural Affinity can then be adjusted to see how subjects of those 
types react to advocates of those or opposing types. Specifying a cultural affinity value at its 
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maximum value, for example, predicts how subjects respond in a case in which the con-argument 
is made by an advocate whose cultural values are maximally close to their own—effectively one 
in her own “quadrant” of the group-grid culture map; and the pro-argument by an advocate 
whose cultural values are maximally remote from their own—necessarily one in the quadrant 
diagonal to the subject’s own. Specifying a cultural affinity value at its minimum value, in 
contrast, would predict how subjects would respond were the pro-argument made by an advocate 
whose values are maximally close to their own and the con-argument by an advocate whose 
values are maximally remote from theirs. Finally, setting the Cultural Affinity variable at zero 
predicts how subjects would respond when both advocates had values equally proximate 
(including either maximally close or maximally remote) from theirs. 
Table 4 presents estimates under various alignments of advocates and arguments. In the 
“expected alignment” scenario, the Cultural Affinity value is set at its maximum for hierarchical 
individualists and at its minimum for egalitarian communitarians. The resulting values simulate 
how such subjects would respond were the pro-argument made by the egalitarian communitarian 
advocate and the con-argument made by the hierarchical individualist (see Figure 2). The 
difference in resulting risk perceptions is large and statistically significant. In the “unexpected 
alignment” scenario, the Cultural Affinity value is set at its minimum for hierarchical 
individualists and at its maximum for egalitarian communitarians. The resulting values then 
represent how such subjects would respond were the con-argument made by the egalitarian 
communitarian advocate and the pro-argument made by the hierarchical individualist. The 
difference in the estimated values now is extremely small and not statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with the credibility-heuristic hypothesis that the cultural identity of advocates 
can accentuate or mitigate polarization in risk perceptions of culturally diverse subjects. 
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Table 4. Expected Values for Risk Perceptions by Cultural Worldview in “Culturally 
Identifiable Advocate Condition 
 
 Advocate-Argument Alignment 
 Expected Unexpected Intramural  
 EV EV Depolar. EV Depolar.
Hierarchical Individualist 
 
3.27 
(0.08) 
2.93 
(0.08)  
3.10 
(0.04)  
Egalitarian Communitarian 
 
2.44 
(0.08) 
2.77 
(0.08) 
-0.67 
(0.24) 
2.60 
(0.04) 
-0.33 
(0.12) 
Hierarchical Communitarian 
 
3.16 
(0.08) 
2.83 
(0.08)  
3.00 
(0.06)  
Egalitarian Individualist 
 
2.54 
(0.08) 
2.87 
(0.08) 
-0.58 
(0.24) 
2.71 
(0.06) 
-0.33 
(0.12) 
N = 1,032. Estimated values derived from regression model for 4-pt VACRISK scale in Table 
“Depolar.” indicates decrease in size of the difference between paired groups in the specified 
advocate-argument alignment compared to the difference between those groups in the 
“expected alignment.” Standard errors in parentheses. Bold denotes difference between paired 
groups, or decrease in size of difference relative to “expected alignment” (“Depolar.”), 
significant at p ≤ .05. 
The hypothesis is also consistent with the result generated in a so-called “intramural 
alignment” scenario. There the Cultural Affinity value is set at zero. The estimated VACRISK 
values are now consistent with those that result when subjects react to arguments made by 
advocates whose values are equally proximate to theirs—as they would be, for example, if 
subjects of a particular combination of worldviews received information from advocates who 
both shared or rejected her outlooks. A significant difference persists between the risk 
perceptions of hierarchical individualists and those of egalitarian communitarians (as one would 
expect based on the significant coefficient for Hierarchy and marginally significant coefficient 
for Individualism, respectively, in the regression analysis), but the size of the difference is 
significantly smaller than it is in the “expected alignment” scenario. 
Similar results are observed for Hierarchical Communitarians and Egalitarian 
Individualists. If subjects of these types observe advocates who share their values advancing the 
arguments that fit the subjects’ respective predispositions (pro- for Egalitarian Individualists and 
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con- for Hierarchical Communitarians), and observe advocates who reject their values advancing 
arguments that conflict with subjects’ predispositions, the estimated gulf between subjects with 
these values widens. The estimated gap shrinks, in contrast, if the argument-advocate alignment 
is reversed, as it does if subjects of these types observe advocates whose values are equally 
proximate or remote from their own on both sides of the debate. 
Analytic Summary  
The results of both stages of the experiment are summarized in Figure 4. As expected, 
hierarchy and individualism, particularly when combined, disposed subjects to be more 
concerned, egalitarianism and communitarianism to be less, about the risks of HPV vaccination. 
Those dispositions exerted a relatively modest effect in the absence of arguments about the risks 
and benefits of the vaccine. Consistent with biased assimilation and polarization, however, the 
size of the disagreement between subjects with those values grew when they were exposed to 
balanced arguments. 
Consistent with the credibility heuristic hypotheses, moreover, the polarizing effect of 
information was highly sensitive to the cultural identity of the advocates making pro- and con-
arguments. The results of this part of the experiment suggest that polarization grows where 
culturally diverse subjects see the argument they are disposed to accept being made by the 
advocate whose values they share, and the argument they are predisposed to reject being made 
by the advocate whose values they repudiate. In contrast, when subjects see the argument they 
are disposed to reject being made by the advocate whose values they share, and the argument 
they are predisposed to accept being made by the advocate whose values they repudiate, 
polarization shrinks to the point of disappearing. When subjects see the arguments being made 
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by advocates whose values are equally congenial (or uncongenial) to theirs, polarization is 
modest. 
Figure 4. Risk Perceptions By Culture Type Across Conditions. Scores on 4-point VACRISK 
scale under experimental conditions specified in Tables 2 and 4. Confidence intervals reflect 
0.95 level of confidence. 
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Discussion 
The central hypotheses of the study were largely vindicated. The results of the 
experiment suggest that disagreements about the risks and benefits of HPV vaccination are 
shaped by cultural values, which exert their influence through the biased assimilation of 
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information and through attributions of information-source credibility. We now consider some of 
the implications of these findings. 
Advancing the Cultural Theory of Risk 
Most of the work to date in cultural theory has been correlational in nature. Large-sample 
surveys furnish support for cultural theory because they reveal that risk perceptions are 
distributed across persons in patterns that can be cogently explained only if individuals’ values 
are exerting an influence—one independent of myriad other factors associated with variance in 
risk perception—on individuals’ beliefs about societal dangers and how they should be abated 
(see Kahan et al., 2007, p. 473). Nevertheless, this mode of proof is necessarily indirect. 
Correlations suggest causation but don’t prove it, in this setting primarily because they don’t 
permit observation of the psychological mechanisms through which cultural values influence risk 
perceptions. 
Continued advancement of cultural theory thus depends on experimental investigations 
designed to furnish direct evidence of such mechanisms. By documenting the role played by two 
mechanisms—biased assimilation and the credibility heuristic—our study helps to corroborate 
and extend cultural theory. 
Advancing Enlightened Public Deliberation on Risk Regulation 
The results of our study also have practical implications for the role of public 
deliberations in risk regulation. Indeed, the mechanisms of cultural cognition we have identified 
suggest an approach to public risk communication that is quite different from conventional 
strategies. 
The scholarly study of risk regulation is dominated by two theories, which support 
opposing philosophies of risk communication. The “rational weigher” position asserts that 
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individuals, in aggregate and over time, tend to process information about risk in a manner that 
promotes their expected utility (Starr, 1969; Viscusi, 1983; Philipson & Posner, 1993). This 
theory implies that the best way to promote sensible democratic decisionmaking about risk is 
simply to disseminate sound scientific information as widely as possible.  
The “irrational-weigher” theory, in contrast, holds that individuals, due to various 
cognitive limitations and biases, are incapable of processing risk information in a manner that 
promotes their expected utility (Margolis, 1996; Sunstein, 2005). This position counsels 
transferring as much risk regulatory power as possible to politically insulated experts, whose 
specialized training permits them to evaluate information more dispassionately and 
systematically (Breyer, 1993; Sunstein, 2005). Risk communication, on this view, is simply a bad 
idea; because the public is inherently predisposed to react irrationally, the dissemination of even 
scientifically sound information is likely to trigger inordinate states of alarm, which in turn 
provoke ill-considered regulatory responses from democratically accountable political 
institutions (Kuran & Sunstein, 1998). Accordingly, when governmental and other experts are 
confronted with public concerns over particular risks, “the best approach may well be this:  
Change the subject. . . . [D]iscuss something else and to let time do the rest” (Sunstein, 2005, p. 
125). 
At first glance, the mechanisms of cultural cognition can be seen as amplifying the 
irrational-weigher theory’s skepticism about the efficacy of risk communication (Sunstein, 
2006). Corroborating earlier findings (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2009), our study 
found that individuals are motivated selectively to credit empirical claims in a manner that 
coheres with their visions of the ideal society.  When they see advocates debating such a risk, 
individuals, we found, are motivated to defer to the ones who they perceive to share their basic 
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view of how society should be organized. Because the same forces that motivate individuals 
generally to adopt positions congenial to their cultural outlooks are likely to induce policy 
advocates to do so, a deliberative climate is likely to emerge in which culturally diverse members 
of the public consistently see advocates they identify with presenting arguments they are already 
predisposed to accept, and advocates they do not identify with presenting arguments they are 
predisposed to reject. The self-reinforcing effects of culturally biased assimilation and cultural 
credibility thus make the prospect for spontaneous convergence on sound scientific information 
exceedingly remote. 
Nevertheless, the cultural cognition account of why risk communication can easily fail is 
more complicated than the irrational-weigher theory’s, and ultimately less despairing of the 
prospects for informed democratic deliberation. The irrational weigher theory attributes 
discrepancies between expert and public risk perceptions solely to the public’s reliance on “error 
prone” heuristic or “system 1” forms of reasoning (Sunstein, 2005; Kahneman, 2003). But the 
cultural cognition of risk shows that the interaction of heuristic reasoning with individual values 
must be taken into account as well in order to explain how exposure to the common information 
can generate pronounced individual differences among persons of diverse outlooks and related 
characteristics.  If making public deliberations responsive to the guidance of sound scientific 
evidence depends on endowing members of the public with the capacity to evaluate scientific 
evidence through use solely of systematic or “system 2” forms of reasoning, then irrational-
weigher theorists are clearly right to believe that sound risk regulation is not compatible with 
genuinely participatory modes of  lawmaking. But if the antagonism between heuristic reasoning 
and recognition of sound scientific evidence is attributable in larger part to the polarizing 
influence of cultural cognition, then risk communication strategies aimed at neutralizing or 
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mitigating cultural cognition might make the objective of enlightened public deliberations over 
risk much more realistic (Kahan, 2008). 
The results of our study suggest the possibility of such strategies. As evidenced in the 
biased assimilation experiment, hierarchical individualists were disposed to see the HPV vaccine 
as risky, the egalitarian communitarians to see it as safe. But if subjects of those types observed 
advocates of their respective persuasions arguing for and against mandatory vaccination, 
respectively, egalitarian communitarians saw significantly more risk and hierarchical 
individualists significantly less. As a result, in this “unexpected alignment” scenario, the views 
of such subjects approached convergence, presumably because they were then deriving 
comparable informational content from the arguments for and against mandatory vaccination. It 
might be inferred, then, that one technique for eliminating cultural polarization is to arrange for 
members of the public to be exposed to debates in which advocates of diverse cultural identities 
present positions contrary to the predispositions of those who share their values. 
But this strategy for mitigating cultural conflict on risk strikes us as unrealistic and likely 
self-defeating. The proposal to orchestrate counter-intuitive pairings of arguments and advocates 
not only assumes an unrealistic degree of control over who says what—or is perceived to be 
saying what—in public debate. It also ignores a very real risk that such orchestration will 
backfire. Ordinary citizens are of course aware that they must rely on trustworthy sources to 
identify which contested empirical claims are worthy of belief; they are thus aware that parties 
with an interest in the acceptance of one or another claim have an incentive to manipulate public 
perceptions of the position that trusted authority figures hold. As a result, if they suspect 
manipulation, members of the public (quite sensibly) are likely to take it as corroboration that the 
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position they were predisposed to reject is in fact the weaker one—a dynamic Lessig (1995) calls 
the “Orwell effect.” 
Indeed, something very much like this appears to have occurred already in the debate 
over mandatory HPV vaccination. In 2007, Texas became the first state with a mandatory school 
vaccination program when its Governor, Rick Perry, issued an executive order creating one. 
Because Perry is a conservative, southern Republican, his action was viewed as signaling 
potential abatement of the ideological opposition that had been halting adoption of HPV 
programs in other states (Blumenthal, 2007). It was revealed shortly thereafter, however, that 
Merck & Co., the manufacturer of what was then the only approved vaccine, had been a 
contributor to Perry’s re-election campaign in 2006. In the resulting uproar, the state legislature 
passed a law overturning the Governor’s order, and Perry backed off his pledge to veto that 
legislation (Elliot, 2007).  
A likely more effective (and morally more defensible) strategy for counteracting the 
influence of cultural cognition in debates over the HPV vaccine is to promote a genuinely 
pluralistic argument environment. The results in the “intramural alignment” scenario of our 
study—in which we measured the impact on subjects when arguments were assigned to 
advocates whose values were equally proximate to the subjects—also significantly reduced 
polarization. This finding suggests that the impact of cultural cognition would be relatively small 
if citizens observed persons of diverse values on both sides of the mandatory vaccination debate. 
Achieving a deliberative environment of that sort would certainly be more feasible than creating 
one in which advocate of various cultural identities consistently advanced positions contrary to 
what one would expect from individuals with their values.  Indeed, achieving a pluralistic-
argument environment of this sort would seem to be especially practicable in structured 
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deliberations (Fishkin, 1991, 1995; Gastil, 2008), where its presence or absence might help to 
explain the uneven patterns of success observed in the literature on this device (Ackerman & 
Fishkin, 2004; Gastil, Black, and Moscovitz, 2008; Schkade, Sunstein & Hastie, 2007). 
Even more important, it seems plausible to believe that efforts to create such an 
environment—in structured deliberative contexts or in public discussion generally—could be 
promoted transparently without risk of Lessig’s “Orwell effect.” Those engaged in seeking out 
and encouraging advocates of diverse persuasions who genuinely believe in their positions to 
participate on both sides of the debate can honest and credibly claim that their goal is not to 
manipulate the public to accept one position; rather it is to enable members of the public to 
decide for themselves what position to adopt in a climate calculated to permit them to consider 
the evidence free of a type of cognitive distortion persons of cultural persuasions resent. 
Of course, one cannot be certain that such a strategy would work based solely on a study 
like the one we conducted. But for the practical-minded public advocate in need of immediate 
guidance, our results suggest that this approach might at least be worth a try. 
Future Research 
Speculations of this sort highlight the likely utility of follow-up studies. Such studies 
could be used both to refine practical strategies for managing the influence of cultural cognition 
on public deliberations and to extending the investigation of the dynamics of cultural cognition 
initiated in this study. 
Indeed, the nature of the interaction of cultural values and the credibility heuristic would 
itself benefit from further examination. Our study suggests that cultural affinity influences source 
credibility but does not indicate exactly how or why. Credibility has been shown to rest on 
certain predicates, including the perceived knowledge and honesty and the likeability of the 
 -32- 
source (Lupia, 2002). One hypothesis worthy of testing, then, is whether these attributes are 
influenced by affinity between the perceived cultural values of the source and those evaluating 
his or her credibility. 
An additional subject for investigation is whether the interaction between culture and 
credibility observed in this study extends to recognizable sources of risk communication. Trust 
of government regulators is an important predictor of risk concern (Slovic, Flynn & Layman, 
1991). Survey research shows that perceived value-affinity is an element of such trust (Siegrist, 
Cvetkovich & Roth, 2000). Possible topics for study, then, include whether the variances in the 
level of trust that individuals have in agencies such as the FDA and the EPA is influenced by the 
affinity between subjects’ cultural values and those they impute to officials in those agencies, 
and, if so, whether trust can be increased through strategies that enhance perceived cultural 
affinity with such officials. 
Finally, and most importantly, the current study should be extended by examinations of 
potential mechanisms of cultural cognition. Interactions with the availability heuristic, with 
affect, with the status quo bias, and with identity-threat all are plausible sources of the impact of 
culture on risk perceptions (Kahan et al., 2007). Cultural cognition also likely interacts with the 
forms of social influence emphasized by the social amplification literature (Kasperson & 
Kasperson, 1996; Pidgeon, Kasperson & Slovic, 2003), explaining how such influences not only 
magnify risk perceptions but also likely magnify individual differences in perceptions, resulting 
in persistent states of polarization. 
. 
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Conclusion 
The cultural theory of risk offers a distinctive, and distinctively provocative, account of 
political conflict over risk. On this account, individuals instinctively perceive behavior they 
abhor to be harmful and behavior they revere as benign (Douglas, 1966). As a result, even when 
citizens share a commitment to tolerating ways of life that differ from their own, they are likely 
to divide into bitter cultural factions as they deliberate over policies to mitigate damage to the 
environment, repel external threats, and promote public health (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
This paper described a study that used disagreement over mandatory HPV vaccination to 
test the cultural theory of risk. That study found that cultural values do indeed seem to generate 
divergent perceptions of the risk and benefits of the HPV vaccine. They exert this influence, 
study results suggest, through two related mechanisms—biased assimilation and the credibility 
heuristic. 
We have discussed what we see as the principal theoretical and practical implications of 
these findings. But by far the most important implication of the study is the likely profit of 
additional studies of the mechanisms of cultural cognition. By identifying the heuristic processes 
through values influence perceptions of harm and danger, properly designed experiments have 
the potential to advance not only our understanding of the cultural theory of risk but also our 
ability to use that theory and related ones to promote enlightened public deliberation on risk 
regulation. 
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Appendix. Information on On-line Sample 
1. Knowledge Networks 
Knowledge Networks and who participated in study experiments via Knowledge 
Network’s on-line testing facilities. Knowledge Networks 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public opinion research firm with offices located 
throughout the United States. It maintains an active respondent pool of some 40,000 persons who 
are recruited to participate in on-line surveys and experiments administered on behalf of 
academic and governmental researchers and private businesses. Its recruitment and sampling 
methods assure a diverse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S. population 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/reviewer-info.html). Studies using Knowledge Net-
works facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed academic journals 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/KN%20Bibliography%20and%20Journals%20
List%20-%203-2-09.pdf). 
2. Demographic composition of sample for this study 
a. Total number of subjects: 1,538. 
b. Gender: 52% female, 48% male. 
c. Race: 73% white, 10% African-American, 12% Hispanic, 5% other. 
d. Average age: 47 years. 
e. Median household income: $40,000 to $49,999. 
f. Median education level: Some college. 
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Footnotes
1 Mandatory programs would make proof of vaccination (offered at state expense) a 
condition of school enrollment. Such programs, however, typically would allow for an “opt out” 
on religious or health grounds. One state, New Hampshire, sponsors a “voluntary” program in 
which vaccination is not a condition of school enrollment and interested parents must “opt in” to 
obtain their daughters’ vaccination (National Conference of State Legislatures 2009). 
2 For functionalist accounts, in which individuals are seen as forming risk perceptions 
congenial to their ways of life precisely because holding those beliefs about risk cohere with and 
promote their ways of life, see Douglas, 1986; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990. 
3 The “biased assimilation” dynamic—that people evaluate information in a manner that 
conforms their priors—is thought to be more strongly supported by empirical research than is the 
polarization dynamic—that disagreement among persons of opposing priors or predispositions 
grows when they are exposed to arguments (MacCoun, 1998; Gerber & Green, 1999). 
4 More information on Knowledge Networks and the sample used for this study can be 
found in the Appendix. 
5 Data on other individual characteristics—including gender, race, and liberal-
conservative ideology—were also collected. However, we did not plan to include those 
characteristics as covariates in the analyses for several reasons. First, because the subjects were 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions, these characteristics were properly treated as 
ignorable for purposes of testing hypothesized differences across the conditions (Gelman & Hill, 
  
2007, 183). Second, previous studies of the influence of cultural cognition have consistently 
found that cultural worldviews more strongly predict risk perceptions than do other individual 
characteristics, many of which explain variance in risk perception only because they correlate or 
interact with cultural worldviews (Kahan et al., 2007; Kahan et al., in press).  Third, the cultural 
credibility hypothesis contemplated that subjects would be influenced by advocates conditional 
on affinity between their own and the advocates’ perceived cultural values; we did not formulate 
hypotheses on the credibility differences of culturally identifiable advocates across subjects 
identified by other characteristics. Finally, testing any such hypotheses simultaneously with the 
testing of hypotheses about the effect of the affinity between subjects’ values and advocates’ 
perceived values (which would have necessitated additional interaction terms for the 
experimental treatments and each additional covariate) would necessarily have demanded a 
substantial increase in sample size in order to assure sufficient power to rule out type 2 errors 
(Gelman & Hill, 2006, p. 438; Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003, p. 297). 
6 As particular instances of the general linear model, MRC and analysis of variance  
generate functionally equivalent measures for assessing experimental results (Cohen, Cohen, 
West & Aiken, 2003, pp. 4-5). MRC, however, permits straightforward linear estimation of the 
explanatory or predictive effect of continuous measures, which in ANOVA are typically 
converted into discrete categorical predictors through median-splits or like sample divisions. The 
latter procedure results in a substantial reduction in statistical power, a consideration particularly 
important for our study. The “biased assimilation” and “cultural credibility” hypotheses made 
predictions about the joint effects of the worldview predictors, which treated as continuous 
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measures could be tested with the entire sample through MRC, but which would have required 
comparisons of sub-groups (“hierarchical individualists” and “egalitarian communitarians”), 
each consisting of approximately only one-fourth of the total sample, to be tested with ANOVA. 
In addition, using ANOVA after converting continuous measures into categorical ones can also 
result in biased estimates because of the sensitivity of the results to the exact location of the point 
or points at which the continuous predictor is split (Maxwell & Delaney, 1993). 
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